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Lynn Walsworth* Interprovincial Enforcement of
Maintenance Orders: New
Principles, New Approaches
The author points out that the existing legislative scheme for interprovincial
enforcement of maintenance orders is premised on common law rules which have
nowbeen rejected by the Supreme Court of Canada. Those same Supreme Court
decisions have opened the door for new legislative approaches to intra-Canadian
enforcement of these obligations. This paper surveys a variety of new responses
based on models in other federal states and on conventions implementing
international maintenance enforcement schemes. It examines the pros and cons
of each and concludes that any one of them would be superior to the scheme now
in force in Canada.
L'auteur trouve que le systeme actuel I6gislatif pour I'exdcution interprovinciale
des pensions alimentaires est basd sur les regles de common law qui ont t6
rejet6es par la Cour suprdme du Canada. Ces m~mes decisions de la Cour
supr6me ont facilit6 des nouvelles modalit6s d'application 16gislatives pour
I'excution de ces obligations au Canada. Cet article examine une variet6 de
r6ponses nouvelles basees sur des modeles existants en d'autres 6tats f6d6raux
et sur les conventions internationales d'ex6cution des r~gimes des pensions
alimentaires. Cet article examine aussi les b6nefices et les limitations de chaque
systbme etjuge que n'importe quel serait sup6rieur au syst6me maintenant en
vigeur au Canada.
Introduction
Receipt of child and spousal support is crucial to the wellbeing of many
members of our society, especially women. Figures contained in the
evidence before the Supreme Court of Canada in 19941 demonstrated that
in situations of separation or divorce where support is payable by one
spouse to the other, either for the benefit of the spouse or the children or
both, the vast majority (around ninety-eight percent) of payor spouses are
male. Adequate living standards for parents and children is a people's
issue, and certainly a government issue, however it is hard to think of
maintenance orders as anything but a woman's issue.
* Lynn Walsworth is a lawyer with Clark & Company in Fredericton, New Brunswick. The
author gratefully acknowledges the support of the Atlantic Canada Ministers Responsible for
the Status of Women in making this paper possible.
1. Thibaudeau v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 627, 124 D.L.R. (4th) 449.
198 The Dalhousie Law Journal
Maritimers are familiar with, and still chuckle about, the "Frank's the
Father" campaign waged by provincial N.D.P. leader Elizabeth Weir a
few years ago when the premier of New Brunswick, Frank McKenna,
announced a provincial campaign to persuade single welfare mothers to
reveal the name of the father of their child in order to force more
delinquent fathers to pay their child support. But the enforcement of
spousal and child support orders is nojoke. As evidenced by the formerly
commonplace expression "Dead-beat Dad", it used to be hard enough to
enforce support orders when the payor spouse lived in the same province
as the payee and had been a party all along to the proceedings in which
the support order was made. The good news is that, in this intraprovincial
context, the percentage of child support orders that can be and are
enforced is rising each year as provincial regulation and enforcement
schemes become more precise, better organized and above-all computer-
ized. The bad news is that, when it comes to maintenance orders made
under provincial legislation in situations where the payor spouse lives out
of the province, especially where that payor spouse was not present and
did not take part in the proceedings from which the order arose, enforce-
ment can be difficult, and sometimes impossible. It may be that the
reluctance of Canadian legislators to revisit this problem in light of new
approaches adopted elsewhere is due to the legislators' lack of realization
of the limitations of the current scheme, or to lack of government
resources to devote to the task. Today, however, as Premier McKenna's
campaign demonstrated, there is more than the altruism of caring for
needy spouses and children at stake. Scarce government resources could
be saved by a more workable interprovincial scheme. In the United States,
where the former interstate support legislation, the Uniform Reciprocal
Enforcement of Support Act2 was developed a decade later than in
Canada, this has always been a concern. David Cavers summarized the
fiscal interest of government:
Breaking through jurisdictional barriers is not easy when claimants have
economic resources enabling them to carry the burden of litigation.
However, maintenance claimants are often poor, frequently on welfare. In
economic terms, government becomes a party in interest, concerned lest
resident claimants become public charges. And, if claimants are already on
relief, the state may seek reimbursement from delinquent providers for the
funds it has advanced to their dependents.'
2. 9 U.L.A. 805 (1973) [hereinafter URESA]. This model statute was promulgated by the
National Conference on Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1950 and has been revised
and amended a number of times since then. All American states enacted some version of
URESA.
3. D. Cavers, "International Enforcement of Family Support" (1981) 81 Col. L. Rev. 994
at 994.
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This paper will examine the deficiencies in the current Canadian
scheme, the applicable principles to be gleaned from the Supreme Court
of Canada's 1990s conflict of laws trilogy,4 recent developments in the
United States, the Hague Conventions on support for children and
collaterals, and the Australian approach.5 From these examinations, this
paper will make suggestions for a new Canadian enforcement of mainte-
nance orders statute to apply within the Canadian federation.
I. The Current Legislation and Conflict of Laws Background
The statutory basis on which recognition and enforcement of mainte-
nance orders is currently accomplished is the Reciprocal Enforcement of
Maintenance Orders Act,6 uniform legislation adopted by all the prov-
inces and both territories. The problem with REMO legislation, in a
nutshell, is that it is based on the concept of the ten provinces of Canada
as being ten separate countries for the purpose of their judicial systems.
Such a concept reflects the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century view
of the Privy Council rather than the current view, even among decentralist
Canadians. In addition, it arguably does not reflect the provisions of our
Constitution. In fact, as La Forest J. stated in Morguard,
4. De Savoye v. Morguard Investments Ltd., [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077, 76 D.L.R. (4th) 256
[hereinafter Morguard cited to S.C.R.]; Hunt v. T&Nplc [1993]4 S.C.R. 289, 109 D.L.R. (4th)
16 [hereinafterHuntcited to S.C.R.]; and Tolofson v. Jensen, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 1022, 120 D.L.R.
(4th) 289 [hereinafter Tolfoson cited to S.C.R.].
5. For a nutshell description of the law on the enforcement of foreign maintenance orders in
federations and unitary states in the Western world as it stood in the mid-1980s, see G.F.
DeHart, International Enforcement of Child Support and Custody (n.p.: American Bar
Association, 1986) at 1-21 .The internal Australian approach, being based on federal law, is
less directly relevant to the present endeavour than are the American and European approaches.
Nonetheless, it contains some components that are valuable to examine when designing a new
Canadian system. For that reason, it will be examined at the end of this paper. As will be seen,
the current Canadian scheme is more restrictive than the current American legislative scheme
for interstate maintenance orders, more restrictive than the Australian interstate scheme, and
even more restrictive than the international scheme set forth in the current Hague convention
of 1973. There is renewed interest internationally in the enforcement of maintenance orders.
On 10 June 1996, Canada and France signed a Convention for The Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters and on Mutual Legal Assistance in
Maintanance [unpublished, not yet in force], including, as Chapter InI, Cooperation for the
Recovery of Maintenance between the two countries. Although a new international treaty
obviously has implications for the individual provinces, this treaty is unfortunately beyond the
scope of this paper.
6. The current version of the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Maintenance Orders Act
[hereinafter REMO] appears in Uniform Law Conference of Canada, Proceedings of the Sixty-
Seventh Annual Meeting (Ottawa: Uniform Law Conference of Canada, 1985) at 418. REMO
has been enacted in every province and territory: Reciprocal Enforcement of Maintenance
Orders Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. R-7; Family Relations Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 121; The Reciprocal
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there is really no comparison between the interprovincial relationships of
today and those obtaining between foreign countries in the 19h century.
Indeed, in my view, there never was and the courts made a serious error in
transposing the rules developed for the enforcement of foreign judgments
to the enforcement of judgments from sister-provinces....
In any event, the English rules seem to me to fly in the face of the obvious
intention of the Constitution to create a single country. This presupposes
a basic goal of stability and unity where many aspects of life are not
confined to one jurisdiction. A common citizenship ensured the mobility
of Canadians across provincial lines, a position reinforced today by s. 6 of
the Charter ....
These [constitutional] arrangements themselves speak to the strong need
for the enforcement throughout the country of judgments given in one
province. But that is not all. The Canadian judicial structure is so arranged
that any concerns about differential quality ofjustice among the provinces
can have no real foundation. All superior court judges-who also have
superintending control over other provincial courts and tribunals-are
appointed and paid by the federal authorities. And all are subject to final
review by the Supreme Court of Canada, which can determine when the
courts of one province have appropriately exercised jurisdiction in an
action and the circumstances under which the courts of another province
should recognize such judgments. Any danger resulting from unfair
procedure is further avoided by sub-constitutional factors, such as for
example the fact that Canadian lawyers adhere to the same code of ethics
throughout Canada....
These various constitutional and sub-constitutional arrangements and
practices make unnecessary a "full faith and credit" clause such as exists
in other federations, such as the United States and Australia.7
In Morguard, the defendant bought property in Alberta but then moved
to British Columbia. The mortgage fell into default and the plaintiff, a
financial institution, sued the defendant in Alberta. The defendant,
although he was properly served notice of the proceeding according to
Enforcement of Maintenance Orders Act, R.S.M. 1987, c. M20; Reciprocal Enforcement of
Maintenance Orders Act, S.N.B. 1985, c. R-4.01; Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Orders
Act, R.S.N. 1990, c. R-5; Maintenance Orders Enforcement Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 268;
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Orders Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. R.7; Reciprocal Enforcement
of Maintenance Order Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. R-7; The Reciprocal Enforcement of Mainte-
nance Orders Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. R-4; Reciprocal Enforcement of Maintenance Orders Act,
R.S.Y. 1986, c. 148; Maintenance Orders (Facilitiesfor Enforcement) Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988,
c. M-3; Reciprocal Enforcement of Maintenance Orders Act, R.S.Q. c. E-19. Further refer-
ences to REMO will be to the uniform Act. For further discussion of REMO see the Law Reform
Commission of Canada's report Family Law: Enforcement of Maintenance Orders (Ottawa:
Information Canada, 1976). For a history of the various amendments to legislation from its
inception in 1946 until 1970, see J.-G. Castel, "Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments in Personam and In Rem in the Common Law Provinces of Canada" (1971) 17
McGill L.J. 11 at 163-79.
7. Morguard, supra note 4 at 1098-100.
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Alberta's service exjuris rules, neither put in an appearance nor submit-
ted in any other way to the jurisdiction of the Alberta court. Application
of the old common law principles would have resulted in the plaintiff's
being unable to recover. The lower courts experimented with different
conflict of laws theories through which to correct this obvious injustice,
and the Supreme Court of Canada settled the issue by the application of
constitutional norms to "new" common law, holding that British Colum-
bia should enforce the Alberta judgments since the province of Alberta
had a real and substantial connection to the subject matter of the litigation.
The common law enunciated in Morguard provides a complete,
although inchoate, scheme for the recognition and enforcement of final
ordinary commercial Canadian judgments, and it is arguable that reme-
dial legislation on the substantive law issues is unnecessary in this field.8
However, the common law does not now and never did have the ability
to come to the rescue of a maintenance order creditor as it came to the
rescue of the judgment creditor in Morguard. This is because the new
common law principles apply, as did the old ones, only tofinaljudgments.
Support orders, being always open to an application to vary based on
changing means and needs of the parties, are never considered "final" in
the same sense as a commercial judgment can be final. Only judgments
for arrears in alimony are considered final. 9 Thus, in the absence of
legislative intervention, a maintenance creditor would have to let the
arrears build up, and then sue on them. Once she recovered one set of
arrears, she would have to let the arrears build up again, and then sue
again. This highly impractical system undoubtedly discouraged many
would-be litigants from pursuing their claims, and it was this problem that
led the predecessor of the Uniform Law Conference to develop REMO.
8. This has not prevented the Uniform Law Conference from promulgating, in 1991, a
Uniform Enforcement of Canadian Judgments Act, intended to replace the Uniform Reciprocal
Enforcement of Judgments Act. However, it differs from the common law of Morguard in
several important ways, as will be referenced in passing later in this paper. The uniform Act
has been heavily criticized: see J. Swan, "The Uniform Enforcement of Canadian Judgments
Act" (1993) 22 Can. Bus. L.J. 87; and V. Black, "Uniform Enforcement of Canadian Judgments
Act; Uniform Law Conference of Canada (1991); Enforcement of Canadian Judgments Act,
S.B.C. 1992, c. 37" (1993) 71 Can. Bar Rev. 721; and contra, A. Close (B.C.'s representative
on the Uniform Law Conference), "Criticism of the Uniform Enforcement of Canadian
Judgments Act" in Uniform Law Conference of Canada, Proceedings of the Seventy-Fifth
Annual Meeting (Ottawa: Uniform Law Conference of Canada, 1993) at 121. These commen-
taries are relevant to the present endeavour in that any new REMO proposals should take into
account the traps into which the Uniform Enforcement of Canadian Judgments Act allegedly
falls.
9. See Castel, supra note 6 at 161-2 and cases cited therein. And if the original court has the
power to vary the arrears then even a judgment for arrears may not be considered final:
Macguire v. Macguire (1921), 50 O.L.R. 100, 64 D.L.R. 180 (S.C. A.D.).
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Our current REMO Acts are a considerable improvement over the
common law. They provide a two-tier scheme wherein an order can be
either final or provisional. A final order is one made in circumstances
wherein the respondent had either proper notice or an opportunity to be
present or represented. If these criteria are fulfilled, the legislation
provides that the order will be recognized and can be enforced without
further proceedings in a reciprocating province or territory. A provisional
order, on the other hand, is one in which these two criteria are not fulfilled.
In order for a provisional order to be enforced, it must first be confirmed
by an order of the court of the receiving province having jurisdiction over
the person liable to pay. At a hearing to confirm a provisional order, the
court being asked to grant the confirmation can remit the matter to the
original court for further evidence, if necessary. Once evidentiary matters
are dealt with, the receiving court may decide to accept the order in its
entirety, to vary it, or to dismiss. There is no obligation on the receiving
court to take into account the same considerations that the original court
did. If the receiving court decides to accept the order or to vary it, the
resulting order becomes final and is registered for enforcement.
Once an order has been registered, the person against whom it was
made has one month after receiving notice of the registration in which to
apply to the registering court to have the registration set aside. Upon such
application, the reviewing court must set the registration aside if the court
in the original state acted without jurisdiction over the person against
whom the order was made, according to the conflict of laws rules of the
receiving state, or if the judgment was obtained by fraud or error. Also,
in a confirmation proceeding, the respondent may raise any issue that he
might have raised in the original proceeding.' °
The confirmation of a provisional order does not affect the ability of
the original court to vary or rescind that order. But such variation or
rescission, to be effective in the receiving state, must be subject to a
successful confirmation hearing. Alternatively, a confirmed order may
be varied or rescinded by the receiving court as if it had originally been
made by that court. In addition, the person bound by the confirmation
order may appeal it, as may the claimant, if the confirming court has made
an order unfavourable to her. The result of this system of possible
modification by two or more different provinces is that there may be in
effect at any one time more than one support order relating to the same set
of facts. The confusion resulting from this situation is clearly undesirable.
10. Castel, ibid. at 169-71; see Re Ducharme v. Ducharme (1963), 39 D.L.R. (2d) I (Ont.
C.A.); and Needham v. Needham, [1964] 1 O.R. 645 (H.C.J.); and REMO, supra note 6,s.5(2).
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It is apparent that REMO is designed, as Castel puts it, "to follow the
husband by reaching him in a reciprocal jurisdiction, where the wife is
residing in the jurisdiction from which the husband has fled.""1I The court
with the real power in interprovincial cases is the court of the jurisdiction
wherein the respondent resides. The REMO scheme mirrored the com-
mon law principles regarding the assumption of jurisdiction laid out in
Emanuel v. Symon.' 2 The development of these principles and their
application in Canada are described in detail in Morguard and will not be
repeated here, but in short, in the pre-Morguard Canadian world, as in the
nineteenth-century English one, a judgment of one Canadian province
would be recognized in another only if the original court had physical
control over the defendant. This event occurred if the defendant was
either present in the.court' s territory when served, or voluntarily submit-
ted to the court's jurisdiction.
This "presence and submission" common law rule of jurisdiction
protected defendants living (or hiding) in England from the long-arm
reach of foreign courts. The rule was developed partly out of genuine
considerations of fairness to defendants (so as not to force them to travel
to the foreign jurisdiction, which might be half a world away), 3 and
partly because of the parochial English view that English law and English
procedure were the best in the world: if a foreign court had issued a
judgment, it was dubious (to the English) whether that judgment was
properly granted, both in law and in procedure. 4 Needless to say, under
these rules the enforcement of many perfectly valid judgments was
thwarted because the defendant, living in one jurisdiction, refused to
make himself present or to voluntarily submit to the courts of another
jurisdiction.
The exception to the presence and submission rule was the principle of
reciprocity, common at international law (and chosen as the preferred
approach by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Morguard5 ). This
principle provides that a court in state B will recognize the judgment of
a court in state A if the court in state A took jurisdiction over the cause of
action in a situation in which, in the same circumstance, the court in state
11. Castel, ibid. at 177.
12. [1908] 1 K.B. 302 (C.A.).
13. The defendant in Emanuel v. Symon, ibid., carried on business in Western Australia and
later moved to England. Such a trip was a journey of weeks or months in the 19th century.
14. For a rather candid view of the parochial bias of the English towards their law, see the
comments of La Forest J. in Tolofson, supra note 4 at 1053.
15. [1988]5 W.W.R. 650 (B.C.C.A.).
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B would also have taken jurisdiction. 16 The Supreme Court of Canada in
Morguard rejected the application of reciprocity to intra-Canadianjudg-
ments as being inappropriate in a federal state. According to Morguard,
for a court to assume jurisdiction, there must be a real and substantial
connection between the forum and the cause of action. The court began
its consideration of what makes a connection real and substantial with the
traditional starting place, a province's service exjuris rules. 7 But one of
the innovations of Morguard was that the service exjuris rules provided
only a starting point. First the court noted that the service exjuris rules in
question did not cover all the circumstances in which jurisdiction would
result; secondly, in other provinces with exjuris rules allowing almost
unlimited service, circumstances would occur in which, notwithstanding
the proper application of the service ex juris rules, jurisdiction in the
forum would not be properly founded. 8
The Supreme Court in Morguard did not attempt to exhaustively list
circumstances wherein a real and substantial connection might be found.
The Court deliberately left these to develop as the common law evolved.
However, it appears that these criteria will involve the people, places, and
subject matter of the claim, and will involve a weighing of factors and
connections. It may be, under this system, that more than one province
would bear a real and substantial connection to the cause of action under
the Morguard test. The determination of the appropriate forum would
then proceed by application of theforum non conveniens test summarized
16. For an example, see the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions
Relating to Maintenance Obligation (2 October 1973), in Hague Conference on Private
International Law, Recuil des conventions/Collection of Conventions (1951 - 1988) (The
Hague: Permanent Bureau of the Conference, 1989) at 202 [hereinafter Collection of Conven-
tions], Article 4: "Provisionally enforceable decisions and provisional measures shall, al-
though subject to ordinary forms of review, be recognised or enforced in the State addressed
if similar decisions may be rendered and enforced in that State." The Australian approach to
international cases is also based on reciprocity (s. 110 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) and
Family Law Regulations 1984 (Cth), ss. 139-156 in Part XVI). An order coming from outside
Australia is labelled "provisional", and the Act provides that "This order is provisional only
unless and until confirmed by a court of competent jurisdiction in Australia." See DeHart,
supra note 5.
17. Morguard, supra note 4 at 1089. This traditional theory of jurisdiction held that, if a
defendant could be properly served, jurisdiction would usually result. The development and
philosophy of this rule is told by C. Walsh, Case Comment on Hunt v. T&Nplc (1994) 73 Can.
Bar Rev. 394 at 405 ff.
18. None of the current provincial service exjuris rules offer any help in laying out criteria
for the assumption ofjurisdiction in an interprovincial maintenance case. Most provinces' rules
merely provide that a respondent can be served ex juris if he is the subject of a claim for
maintenance; see, for example, the New Brunswick Rules of Court, r. 19.01(k). This does not
help us decide whether the principles of order and fairness are satisfied by the forum court
taking jurisdiction over the particular cause of action.
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in Amchem Products Inc. v. British Columbia (Workers' Compensation
Board).'9
Given the adoption, without question, of the presence and submission
limitations on the assumption of jurisdiction by the drafters of REMO
fifty years ago in Canada, it is probable that the old British views
regarding the protection of defendants/respondents and the sanctity of the
law of the receiving state were foremost in the minds of these drafters.
This mind-set goes hand in hand with the old legal assumption that, for
the purpose of the conflict of laws, Canadian provinces were to be treated
separate countries.
Even today, we must recognize that Canadian enforcement of mainte-
nance orders legislation cannot ignore the genuine concerns of fairness to
both parties in a maintenance claim: such legislation must take into
account circumstances in which it may not be fair to impose upon one
party the inconvenience of travel to far corners of our vast country in order
to pursue or to defend a claim. However, as to the other common law
consideration, the superiority of forum law, La Forest J. warns us against
adherence to the mind-set that the law or procedure of another Canadian
province may be suspect. In Morguard he stated: "The Canadian judicial
structure is so arranged that any concerns about differential quality of
justice among the provinces can have no real foundation."2
In Tolofson, the Supreme Court again rejected the argument that the
public policy of one province might prevent it from applying the law of
another province. These statements about the role of public policy in
intra-Canadian cases are, of course, equally applicable to jurisdictional
questions and questions of recognition and enforcement as they are to
choice of law:
[G]iven the fact that the jurisdiction of Canadian courts is confined to
matters in respect of which there is a real and substantial connection with
the forum jurisdiction, I seriously wonder whether the requirement [of the
old common law choice of law rule] that the wrong be actionable in that
jurisdiction is really necessary. It may force or persuade litigants who are
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court to sue elsewhere even though
it may be more convenient for all or most of the parties to sue here. The fact
that a wrong would not be actionable within the territorial jurisdiction of
the forum if committed there might be a factor better weighed in consid-
ering the issue of forum non conveniens or, on the international plane,
whether entertaining the action would violate the public policy of the
forum jurisdiction. Certainly, where the place of the wrong and the forum
are both within Canada, I am convinced that the application of the forum
non conveniens doctrine should be sufficient. I add that I see a limited role,
19. [1993] 1 S.C.R. 897, 102 D.L.R. (4th) 96 [hereinafter Amchem cited to S.C.R.].
20. Supra note 4 at 1099-100.
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Morguard itself was quite explicit about the constitutional nature of
the new conflicts doctrine. La Forest J. declared that, irrespective of
reciprocity, one Canadian province must recognize and enforce the
judgments of another Canadian province out of constitutional obligation.
He stated:
As I see it, the courts of once province should give full faith and credit, to
use the language of the United States Constitution, to thejudgments given
by a court in another province or a territory, so long as that court has
properly, or appropriately, exercised jurisdiction in the action.
22
And if there were any doubt about the constitutional nature of the new
Morguard doctrine of recognition and enforcement, it was expelled by
the Supreme Court in Hunt, where La Forest J. stated:
In any event, I indicated [in Morguard] that the traditional rules emphasiz-
ing sovereignty seem to "fly in the face of the obvious intention of the
Constitution to create a single country". Among the factors I identified that
would also support a more cooperative spirit in recognition and enforce-
ment were (1) common citizenship, (2) interprovincial mobility of citi-
zens, (3) the common market created by the union as reflected in ss. 91(2),
91(10), 121 and the peace, order and good government clause, and (4) the
essentially unitary structure of ourjudicial system with the Supreme Court
of Canada at its apex .... 21
To this end, the lesson from La Forest J.'s trilogy of conflicts cases is
that, as long as a Canadian court has properly assumed jurisdiction over
a cause of action, the judgment issuing from that court should be enforced
without question by the courts of another province. The courts of one
province should not question the public policy or the application of the
principles of natural justice by another province. Jurisdiction is the only
thing that can be questioned, and only then within severe limits.
24
Reciprocity is not necessary under this approach, because the new
21. Tolofson, supra note 4 at 1054-5 [emphasis added].
22. Morguard, supra note 4 at 1102.
23. Hunt, supra note 4 at 322.
24. The Uniform Law Conference in its Uniform Enforcement of Canadian Judgments Act
has gone one step further than full faith and credit, wherein jurisdiction is still open to
examination by the receiving province, and has instead drafted what has been described as
"blind faith and credit", wherein jurisdiction is not to be questioned. Arthur Close, supra note
8 at 123, has argued that the Conference's approach was intentional and is a valid one. But the
fact that, to date, only two provinces, B.C. and P.E.I., have adopted the uniform Act may
indicate that the "blind faith and credit" approach does not attract widespread favour. In
Qudbec, the new Civil Code (art. 3158) provides that there will not be review of foreign
decisions on the merits in Quebec. Nonetheless, Quebec courts must still strictly verify the
jurisdictional competence of the foreign court in accordance with Quebec law (art. 3155): see
G. Goldstein & J. Talpis, "Les perspectives en droit civil qurbfcois de la r forme des
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approach is constitutionally mandated. If the constitution demands that
province A enforce the judgments of province B without questioning
their substance, then it must enforce them, without consideration of
whether province B will do the same for province A. But, of course,
province B will do the same, if it recognizes and accepts its constitutional
obligation.25
The application of the constitutional principles outlined above to
judgment recognition in our federation is notjust an idea whose time has
come politically and in legal theory, it is also, as La Forest J. points out
in Morguard and reiterates in Tolofson, an idea whose time has come
technologically. Notwithstanding the above comments on fairness, it is
arguable that Canada has reached the stage in its technological develop-
ment that the physical barriers separating the regions of our country and
the sheer distances involved no longer represent the problems and the
extreme inconvenience they once did. Airline travel has become com-
monplace: if a respondent or a claimant wants to attend a hearing in
person, planes come and go from most areas of the country every day.
And for cases in which the expense of airline travel is obviously too great
for the parties to bear, a court of the future may even have video-
conferencing available, as such technology becomes more common-
place. 26 In addition, the technology exists to enable a party to easily
instruct counsel in another province. The existence of interprovincial law
firms, the availability and ever-decreasing expense of long-distance
telephone service, the fax machine, and e-mail all reduce the barriers to
effective representation at an out-of-province hearing.
r~gles relatives h l'effet des decisions 6trang~res au Canada" (1995) 75 Can. Bar Rev. 641 at
644-5, (1996) 76 Can. Bar Rev. 115.
25. In the field of the enforcement of ordinary commercial judgments, New Brunswick is one
of two provinces to have enacted the Uniform Foreign Judgments Act, the other province being
Saskatchewan, thus precluding the application of the Morguard principles. See respectively
Foreign Judgments Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. F- 19; and The Foreign Judgments Act, R.S.S. 1978,
c. F- 18. Academic critics have understandably questioned the constitutional validity of the
interprovincial application of the Foreign Judgments Act: C. Walsh, "Private International
Law-Jurisdiction and Recognition of Judgments-Hunt v. T&N PLC" (1994) 10:2 Solicitor's
J. 17; and Case Comment on Hunt v. T&Nplc, supra note 17. The 1996 New Brunswick Throne
Speech announced that the Foreign Judgments Act is to be amended, but the amendments have
not yet been introduced.
26. The technology is now used to conduct some motions at the Supreme Court of Canada,
especially when individuals in a criminal matter represent themselves. Although not ideal, as
the camera focuses on only one face at a time and hence the full flavour of a complicated matter
is not necessarily conveyed, the technology will undoubtedly be improved in the coming years.
However, whether its use will ultimately be expanded to family courts across the nation will
probably depend on the amount of money increasingly cash-strapped governments can apply
to such a program. And this, like other changes to the Canadian scheme of enforcement of
maintenance orders, depends on the political will.
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II. Alternative Approaches for Maintenance Orders
To accomplish the goal of arriving at a simpler system of recognition and
enforcement, necessitating less time and money expended on litigation,
less waiting and less stress for parties separated by provincial barriers,
this paper elaborates three models of recognition and enforcement
systems for maintenance orders. Each is based on the principle that, in the
vast majority of cases, only one hearing should be necessary, and only one
order would ensue. That order would, if made in accordance with the
provisions of any of the proposed systems, be recognized and enforced
without further process by the receiving province. The concept of
provisional and final orders contained in REMO would be eliminated in
the vast majority of cases. In any of the three approaches presented here,
whichever court both correctly and appropriately assumes jurisdiction (to
use the terminology of Morguard) would issue the maintenance order,
and courts of the other provinces should, without exception, enforce it,
not because of reciprocity but by constitutional imperative.
Each of these three options will be presented separately. In each, the
substantive law issues will be framed as follows: (1) What factors will
determine the jurisdiction of a court to make an original order? What role
should the doctrine of forum non conveniens play? What factors will
determine the jurisdiction of a court to modify or dismiss an existing
order? (2) What law should govern the cause of action (the choice of law
question)? (3) Are a registration scheme and a waiting period necessary?
It is useful before plunging into the details to present a brief summary
of the three approaches. Under the first option, the modified common law
approach, the legislation would lay out the jurisdictional rules in a broad,
relatively vague fashion, resembling the real and substantial connection
test of Morguard. It would be implicit that the appropriate forum would
be determined by courts on a case by case basis by examining arguments
of forum conveniens. The modified common law approach provides the
minimum legislative treatment necessary of the substantive conflict of
laws principles, leaving the development of rules to cover most specific
circumstances to case law.
The second option, the modified Hague Convention approach, is
modelled on two Hague Conventions: the 1958 Convention concernant
la reconnaissance et l'exdcution des d6cisions en mati~re d'obligations
alimentaires envers les enfants, 7 and the 1973 Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions Relating to Maintenance
27. Collection of Conventions, supra note 16 at 36. This is in force in nineteen states but
Canada is not among them.
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Obligations.28 Under this second approach,jurisdictional rules would be
laid out in more detail than in the modified common law approach, and
once a court assumed jurisdiction properly its order would be recognized
and enforced in all provinces without further review. However, there
might still be factual circumstances which would fall outside the confines
of the statute; in such a case, resort to the common law might be necessary.
This approach provides a medium amount of legislative treatment.
The third option is the American approach. Under this model, a very
specific, exclusive list of jurisdictional rules would be laid out. This list
would encompass all conceivable convenience factors and real and
substantial connections. There would be only one province or territory
that met the criteria of the statute for obtaining jurisdiction. The statute
would provide that the doctrine of forum non conveniens would have no
application. The province or territory properly taking jurisdiction would
hear and decide the matter, including variation or dismissal of an existing
order, to the exclusion of all others. This approach provides the maximum
legislative treatment.
1. Jurisdiction, forum non conveniens and Variation of Orders
a. The Modified Common Law Approach
Under this approach, criteria for the assumption ofjurisdiction would be
laid out on broad grounds, along the lines of real and substantial
connection. As with ordinary litigation with extra-provincial elements
under the Morguard test, this might result in several different provinces
having the right to assume jurisdiction over the same cause of action. In
a maintenance case, these might be, for example, the province where the
respondent resides, the province where the subject of the maintenance
claim resides (whether child or spouse), or the province where the
obligation was incurred (for example, where the couple lived during their
relationship). All these circumstances might be thought to sustain a real
and substantial connection between the forum and the cause of action.
The claimant (or applicant in case of a variation request) would generally
chose the initial forum.
Once it was established that the province of the claimant's choice
could legally claim jurisdiction, it would be for the respondent to put in
28. Supra note 16. In force in seventeen countries but not Canada. The 1958 Convention
covers only maintenance obligations to children, while the 1973 one covers both obligations
to children and those to spouses and ex-spouses. The official version of the first convention
exists only in French. Beginning in 1961, the Hague Convention produced official versions of
Conventions in both French and English.
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an appearance in that forum to litigate the issue offorum non conveniens
if he preferred to have the matter heard in a different court. The criteria
for determining whether a forum is forum conveniens are elaborated upon
in Amchem.29 These include expense, inconvenience or hardship to one
of the parties (including when the claimant's choice of a forum is abusive
or vexatious to the respondent), and juridical advantage or disadvantage,
including the difficulty in proving the proper law in the putative forum
state. While Amchem involved product liability litigation in the interna-
tional context, the words of Sopinka J. can by analogy be applied to
maintenance cases:
With the increase of free trade and the rapid growth of multi-national
corporations it has become more difficult to identify one clearly appropri-
ate forum for this type of litigation. The defendant may not be identified
with only onejurisdiction.... Frequently, there is no single forum that is
clearly the most convenient or appropriate for the trial of the action but
rather several which are equally suitable alternatives....
This does not mean, however, that "forum shopping" is now to be
encouraged. The choice of the appropriate forum is still to be made on the
basis of factors designed to ensure, if possible, that the action is tried in the
jurisdiction that has the closest connection with the action and the parties
and not to secure to one of the litigants at the expense of others in a
jurisdiction that is otherwise inappropriate.30
After this introductory statement, Sopinka J. went on to discuss the
history and current state of the law of forum non conveniens, and to state
the criteria that a court should apply. He noted that the onus was on the
defendant to demonstrate that there was another forum which was clearly
more appropriate for the pusuit of the action.3' Once this is established the
onus shifts to the plaintiff to show that depriving it of its chosen forum
would be unjust.
When will it be unjust to deprive the plaintiff in the foreign proceeding of
some personal orjuridical advantage that is available in that forum? I have
already stated that the importance of the loss of advantage cannot be
assessed in isolation. The loss of juridical or other advantage must be
considered in the context of the other factors. The appropriate inquiry is
whether it is unjust to deprive the party seeking to litigate in the foreign
jurisdiction of a judicial or other advantage.
3 2
This discussion gives little concrete guidance to those considering the
convenience and inconvenience factors in a case of interprovincial
maintenance litigation; it is not meant to. The whole approach is, as in
29. Supra note 19.
30. Ibid. at9ll-2.
31. Ibid. at919-20.
32. Ibid. at 933.
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Morguard, to let the common law develop to take care of individual
circumstances. While this may result in increased litigation at first, it is
thought that the law will stabilize in time and a set of defined conditions
will develop.
Under the modified common law approach to maintenance orders,
after both jurisdiction and forum non conveniens were decided, the
litigation would proceed upon the merits. The chosen forum would then,
because of the constitutional imperatives described above, function as the
only forum that could both correctly and appropriatly issue a maintenance
order in that case. Courts of other provinces should enforce the resulting
order without question, and without the necessity of a second hearing.
Determination of jurisdiction to entertain a claim for variation or
dismissal of an existing order could work in one of two ways. It could
proceed along the same principles as determination of original jurisdic-
tion. In other words, it would be open to the respondent on a request by
either party to vary or rescind to convince any court to which the request
was directed that the court was not forum conveniens. Alternatively, the
legislation could declare that the court of original jurisdiction maintained
jurisdiction to vary or dismiss its own order to the exclusion of all other
courts, unless that court could be convinced that it was no longerforum
conveniens. This is to say that all requests for variation or dismissal of an
original order could only be made to the original court, and only when
physical circumstances (as opposed to means and needs) changed could
the issue of forum non conveniens be relitigated.
b. The Modified Hague Convention Approach
The second option for determination of jurisdiction proposed by this
paper is modelled on the Hague Conventions of 1958 and 1973. 33 Under
the Convention of 1958 (the Child Support Convention), the jurisdic-
tional criteria for an enforceable order are relatively few in number, but
they are listed with more precision than is suggested under the modified
common law approach. They are as follows:
1. the authorities of the state in which the requested payor has his
habitual residence at the time the cause of action is commenced;
2. the authorities of the state in which the payee of child support has her
habitual residence at the time the cause of action is commenced;
3. an authority to which the payor submitted either expressly or im-
pliedly on the merits of the case, and not simply to challengejurisdiction.34
33. Supra notes 16 & 27.
34. Supra note 27, art. 3 [author's translation].
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The Hague Convention of 1973 extended to support payable by one
adult to another. It provides, as does the 1958 Convention, that a decision
from one contracting state shall be recognized and enforced by another
contracting state if it was rendered according to the jurisdictional rules of
the Convention, and is no longer subject to review in the state of origin.
The jurisdictional principles, only slightly revised from the above, are as
follows:
1. if either the maintenance debtor or the maintenance creditor had his
habitual residence in the State of origin at the time when the proceedings
were instituted; or
2. if the maintenance debtor and the maintenance creditor were nationals
of the state of origin at the time when the proceedings were instituted; or
if the defendant had submitted to the jurisdiction of the authority,
either expressly or by defending on the merits of the case without objecting
to the jurisdiction ... [or]
3. the maintenance is due by reason of a divorce or a legal separation, or
a declaration that a marriage is void or annulled, obtained from an authority
of that State recognized as having jurisdiction in that matter, according to
the law of the State addressed. 5
As noted above, even the Hague Conventions, drawn up to regulate the
relations between foreign countries, allow more flexibility than our
REMO legislation. The Hague Conventions allow a claimant to initiate an
action in her own jurisdiction and to have the resulting order recognized
and enforced by another jurisdiction without a review on the merits and
without another hearing, provided that the defendant had notice of the
initial proceeding. The defendant is allowed to put in an appearance,
without prejudice, to challenge jurisdiction. Even default judgments will
be recognized and enforced unless the default occurred through no fault
of the defendant.
36
The approach of the Hague Conventions could be applied in the intra-
Canadian context. The jurisdictional rules are simple: residence of the
claimant, residence of the defendant, or a jurisdiction in which the
defendant was either present or to which he submitted. The latter
condition is, of course, already part of REMO, and the second condition
usually goes hand-in-hand with the last one. The new aspect, for Cana-
dian provinces, would be the allowance of the assumption of final
jurisdiction by the courts of the residence of the claimant, with the
judgment not to be open to review by the receiving jurisdiction.
35. Supra note 16, arts. 7 & 8.
36. Ibid., art. 6.
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These three conditions would cover most of the circumstances of
interprovincial maintenance claims involving either adults or children.
The approach can be viewed as imposing a moderate amount of legisla-
tive treatment on the subject matter as opposed to the minimal legislative
treatment called for in option 1. However, under the modified Hague
Convention approach, there might be a few cases that would slip between
the cracks. Suppose, for example, that the claimant launched a suit in the
province of residence of a child to whom support was owed, where that
province was not the state of habitual residence of the claimant herself.
In such a case, the forum might be found to have jurisdiction based on a
real and substantial connection test (see the discussion of the child-state
test, below), but would not have jurisdiction under the statute. The only
way to ensure that all cases are caught by the statute is to draft a more
comprehensive, but necessarily more complex, list of jurisdictional
criteria. This is what the American approach attempts.
c. The American Approach
The third option proposed by this paper is the most comprehensive, but
also the most categorical of the three, and hence, a little riskier constitu-
tionally than the other two approaches. It can be considered the maximum
legislative treatment. This approach is demonstrated by the recent Ameri-
can uniform legislation, the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act37
drafted by the Conference for the Uniformity of State Laws in 1992.
UIFSA lays out a complete list of circumstances that will ground
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all others. This list being exhaustive, there
seems to be no room for the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Once a
state has properly taken jurisdiction, it must hear the case; it cannot
decline to do so. Only by agreement of the parties can a case be moved
from the state that "owns" it. The resulting judgment will be recognized
and enforced in all the other states.
This guiding principle of UIFSA is called continuing, exclusive
jurisdiction. Only one state will have jurisdiction over one fact scenario
out of which a claim for maintenance arises. Once that state is initially
determined (this being the threshold issue to the awarding of mainte-
nance), that state maintains jurisdiction until all the parties involved-
payor, payee and children, if any-have moved out of the jurisdiction
(unless the parties consent otherwise). Only then does the original state
lose its continuing, exclusive jurisdiction. Even after a state has lost its
37. Hereinafter UIFSA. For text of this model statute along with commentary see J. Sampson,
"Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (with Unofficial Annotations)" (1993) 27 Fam.
L.Q. 93.
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continuing exclusive jurisdiction through the application of the above
criterion, the original support order issued by that state retains its validity
and is enforceable anywhere in the federation until a claim is made to vary
it. Then the issue of jurisdiction must be re-determined, and, once
decided, a new state assumes continuous, exclusive jurisdiction. The
theory behind the jurisdictional principle of UIFSA is that, once the
original state has properly assumed jurisdiction, the burden should be on
the person moving away to return to the original state to relitigate
maintenance issues.
The bases on whichjurisdiction must be assumed by a state over a non-
resident are as follows:
1. the individual is personally served with [citation, summons, notice]
within this State;
2. the individual submits to the jurisdiction of this State by consent, by
entering a general appearance, or by filing a responsive document having
the effect of waiving any contest to personal jurisdiction;
3. the individual resided with the child in this State;
4. the individual resided in this State and provided prenatal expenses or
support for the child;
5. the child resides in this State as a result of the acts or directives of the
individual;
6. the individual engaged in sexual intercourse in this State and the child
may have been conceived by that act of intercourse;
38
7. the individual asserted parentage in the [putative father registry]
maintained in this State by the [appropriate agency]; or
8. there is any other basis consistent with the constitutions of this State
and the United States for the exercise of personal jurisdiction.3 9
The American Uniform Law Commission had examined two other
models before arriving at the above text. The first of these was the former
American uniform legislation, URESA,4° with its multi-tiered system of
38. At the 1992 Annual Meeting a commissioner pointed out that, by limiting the jurisdiction
claim to conception via "sexual intercourse", modem scientific methods of conception would
not create long-arm jurisdiction. To this criticism, John Sampson, author of the annotations to
UIFSA, ibid., states that "the response is that subsection (8) is sufficiently broad to cover all
new topics." This, however, is arguable. It could be asserted that the purpose of subsection 8
is to allow for new, unforeseen, developments in the common law. In vitro and test-tube
fertilization clearly are not new, and could easily be drafted into (7), to avoid any inkling that
they might have been deliberately excluded.
39. UIFSA, supra note 37, s. 201.
40. Supra note 2.
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support orders.4 This was rejected, as the cumbersome process of
multiple hearings was the primary reason for reform in the first place.
The second model examined by the Uniform Commissioners was the
child-state model. Under this, the state wherein the child resides would
be mandated to assert jurisdiction in all child support cases, whether or
not the noncustodial parent had contacts with that state. This circum-
stance is impliedly allowed under the Hague Convention of 1958,
assuming that the child lives with the support claimant. However, this
approach was reluctantly rejected by the Uniform Commissioners, and
was excluded as item 9 in the official text of UIFSA. This was because,
fouteen years earlier, the U.S. Supreme Court in Kulko v. Superior Court
of California for San Francisco,42 had ruled that the wording in a
California statute similar to the wording in s. 201(8), above, did not allow
for the child-state model. In the circumstances before it, the Court held
that the child-state model was unconstitutional as it violated due process
and basic principles of fairness. In Kulko the father, as the custodial
parent, was residing in New York with the two children in New York
while the mother lived in California. Later the father consented for one
child to join her mother. About two years after that, the mother arranged
for the other child to join her, this time without the custodial father's
consent. The mother then sought a child maintenance order against the
father in California, grounding her claim on a California statute which
incorporated the language of s. 201(8). The Supreme Court of the United
States held that personal jurisdiction could not be obtained over the non-
resident husband, stating that to allow such claim would violate due
process. Applying a balancing test, the Court found that basic consider-
ations of fairness, coupled with the fact that the father did not receive any
benefit for submitting himself to the jurisdiction of California, sustained
this view.
It is an open question whether the Supreme Court of Canada would
agree with the U.S. Supreme Court in Kulko. Our court might well find
that the residence of the child, absent any other connection of the
respondent to that province, was a real and substantial connection
sufficient to ground jurisdiction within the constitutional principles of
Morguard and Hunt. This is especially so because our federation contains
both common law and civil law jurisdictions. Therefore when formulat-
41. "Currently under the Act, a URESA order exists independently from any other support
order. That means that several conflicting support orders governing the same parties and child
can exist at the same time." M.C. Haynes, "Supporting our Children: A Blueprint for Reform"
(1993) 27:1 Fam. L.Q. 7 at 16 (a commentary on the Report of the Interstate Commission on
Child Support).
42. 436 U.S. 84 (1978) [hereinafter Kulko].
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ing law and policy our Supreme Court gives more weight to civil law
principles and to European precedents than does the American Supreme
Court. It might be that a Canadian child-state clause would be upheld, or
that a catch-all clause such as 201(8) would be held to allow the child-
state principle to operate.
As noted above, the American approach of UIFSA leaves no room for
the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Either a state has continuing,
exclusive jurisdiction or it does not. "The privilege of declining jurisdic-
tion, thereby creating a vacuum, is not authorized under UIFSA."'43 It is
possible, however, for a state to transfer the proceedings to another state
under the Uniform Transfer of Litigation Act if both states agree that such
a transfer is appropriate."
With regard to modification of an existing order, UIFSA provides that
only the original state may entertain an application to vary or dismiss,
until such time as the original state loses its continuing, exclusive
jurisdiction. This loss of jurisdiction can only happen in two circum-
stances: upon agreement of all the parties, or when all parties have left the
original state. When all parties have left the original state, the original
rules for determining jurisdiction do not apply to a redetermination of
jurisdiction. Instead, the litigant seeking modification must make appli-
cation to the state of residence of the respondent to the petition. This so-
called cross-over jurisdiction is based on the theory that, when both
parties have moved out of the original state,
the burden to litigate at a distance is placed upon the individual who is
seeking the modification. In short, there is a perfectly valid order in
existence, and the person who seeks to change it bears the burden of
litigating at a distance. [Cross-over jurisdiction] attempts to achieve a
rough justice between the parties in the majority of cases by preventing a
litigant from choosing to seek modification in a local court to the marked
disadvantage of the other party. For example, an obligor visiting the
children at the residence of the obligee cannot be validly served with
citation accompanied by a motion to modify the support order."
In its final report to Congress in 1992, the Commission on Interstate
Child Support stated: "The Commission recommends that Congress
43. Sampson, supra note 37 at 164.
44. See ibid. at 120, footnote 64. The Canadian Uniform Law Conference has proposed a
transfer of litigation statute (the Uniform Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act,
1994, intended as a companion piece to the Uniform Enforcement of Canadian JudgmentsAct);
however, the Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act, as is apparent from the title,
also attempts to deal exhaustively with jurisdictional principles, which may be one of the
reasons it has yet to be adopted by any province.
45. Sampson, ibid., at p. 163 of the text and fn. 158. There is generally no appeal of
maintenance orders, only modification based on change of circumstances.
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require all states to enact UIFSA, effective as of a certain date, as a
condition of receiving federal funds."46 In 1993 the U.S. Congress
partially complied with this request, introducing legislation requiring
each state to enact UIFSA without material change by 1 January 1996,
although no penalties were attached for failure to comply.
2. Choice of Law
After jurisdiction (and forum non conveniens, if applicable) are deter-
mined under any of the three options described above, the forum must
then decide which law applies to a claim for maintenance. REMO
stipulates that the law to be applied in its provisional-confirmation order
scheme is that of the residence of the maintenance claimant, at least if that
law is pleaded. URESA (the former American interstate enforcement
scheme), on the other hand, directed that the law to be applied should be
the law of the state wherein the obligation was incurred. This choice of
law rule is probably the closest to the approach the common law would
take today if left to its own devices. The analogy can be made to tort law,
wherein the choice of law within Canada is the lex loci delicti, the law of
the place of the tort. This rule found favour with the Supreme Court of
Canada in Tolofson47 because, as La Forest J. pointed out, if a person
travels to other parts of the country, he or she should not find it unusual
or burdensome to be bound by the laws of these places during the time of
the visit.
However, in the United States under URESA, this place of the obliga-
tion rule created great confusion and complexity for courts and liti-
gants.48 As Sopinka J. noted in Amchem,49 it is sometimes difficult to
determine the place in which the obligation was incurred. As a result of
the difficulties encountered with the rule, the Commissioners who drafted
UIFSA decided that a simpler approach was necessary. UIFSA thus takes
the position that the choice of law should always be that of the state that
has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction, i.e. the forum. No pleading nor
introduction of another law is permitted.
46. U.S. Interstate Commission on Child Support, Supporting Our Children: A Blueprint for
Reform (Washington, D.C.: U.S. G.P.O., 1992) at 236, cited in J.J. Sampson & P.M. Kurtz,
"UIFSA: An Interstate Support Act for the 21 st Century" (1993) 27 Fam. L.Q. 85 at 89-90; see
also Haynes, supra note 41.
47. Supra note 4.
48. See M.C. Haynes, supra note 41 at p. 11; and Sampson & Kurtz, supra note 46 at p. 88,
describing the situation as one of "chaos and confusion".
49. Supra note 19 at 911.
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Two Hague Conventions on choice of law in maintenance obligation
cases, separate from the conventions discussed above, exist.5° The 1956
Convention sur la loi applicable aux obligations alimentaires envers les
enfants"' (companion piece to the Hague Convention of 1958 discussed
above), takes a different approach to choice of law from the American
statute. Article 1 of that instrument declares that the proper law shall be
the law of the place of residence of the child claiming support. The 1973
Convention on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations,52 com-
panion piece to the Hague Convention of the same year discussed above,
adds to these provisions. It states:
Article 4
The internal law of the habitual residence of the maintenance creditor shall
govern the maintenance obligations referred to in Article 1.
In the case of a change in the habitual residence of the creditor, the internal
law of the new habitual residence shall apply as from the moment when the
change occurs.
Article 5
If the creditor is unable, by virtue of the law referred to in Article 4, to
obtain maintenance from the debtor, the law of their common nationality
shall apply.
Article 6
If the creditor is unable, by virtue of the laws referred to in Articles 4 and
5, to obtain maintenance from the debtor, the internal law of the authority
seized shall apply.
In Canada, the only pertinent question regarding choice of law in
interprovincial maintenance cases is whether that choice is constitution-
ally permissible. In Tolofson,53 La Forest J. reminds us a province will
50. Collection of Conventions, supra note 18. The U.N. also has such a convention: the
Convention for the Recovery Abroad of Maintenance, 20 June 1956, 268 U.N.T.S. 3, which
predates the 1956 Hague Conventions by a few months. It does not purport to contain
jurisdictional rules of private international law. It merely provides a process forthe expeditious
transmission of documents relating to a claim or order for support. The claim or order must still
be processed by the receiving state according to its normal jurisdictional rules of private
international law. However, a choice of law rule is provided. Article 6, paragraph 3, provides:
"Notwithstanding anything in this Convention, the law applicable in the determination of all
questions arising in any such action or proceedings shall be the law of the State of the
respondent, including its private international law."
51. Collection of Conventions, supra note 16.
52. Convention on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations (Draft Convention) in
conference de La Haye de Droit international priv6, Actes etdocuments de la Douzi~me session,
2 au 21 octobre 1972, v. 1 (The Hague: Imprimerie nationale, 1974) at 53.
53. Supra note 4.
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only be able to impose its law on a cause of action if that cause of action
is sufficiently connected with the province to fall under the scope of s. 92
of the Constitution Act, 1867 and its words "within the province." Choice
of law has traditionally followed jurisdiction, but, as Tolofson points out,
that is not necessarily constitutionally correct when jurisdiction can be
taken by a number of different provinces, each of which might have a real
and substantial connection with the cause of action.
It seems, therefore, that under the modified common law approach
described above, it would be logical to determine choice of law by the
modem common law rule, the place wherein the obligation was incurred.
This would certainly not be a bad or an incorrect approach; however, the
American experience should warn us that it is not always an easy one.
The second option, the modified Hague Convention approach, chooses
the law of the place of the support claimant as its choice of law rule. This
is simple to ascertain and would, for the most part, be easy to apply, since
the law of the place of residence of the claimant would almost always be
the law of the forum under the Convention's jurisdictional rules. How-
ever, some fact situations can be envisaged in which the constitutional
underpinnings of applying this rule to the intra-Canadian context would
be suspect. If, for example, a mother in one province were suing a father
in another province for support payments for children who lived with
their grandparents in a third province, and the support were to be paid
directly to the grandparents, the connection between the third province
and the forum might be too tenuous to constitutionally sustain the choice
of law rule.
Under option three, the American approach, choice of law follows
jurisdiction. Because jurisdiction is sufficiently limited so that only one
state, province or territory has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction, the
choice of law will always be that of the forum. It is arguable that this rule
is constitutionally supportable under the principles described above,
since any province that takes jurisdiction must have a real and substantial
connection to the cause of action. This option is as simple as the Hague
Convention choice of law rule, but arguably more likely to withstand
constitutional scrutiny.
3. Registration, Enforcement and Waiting Periods
Presently at common law in Canada, in the absence of a registration
scheme, a judgment creditor can get his or her judgment enforced in
another province only by suing on that judgment. The full faith and credit
system as elucidated in Morguard did not change this aspect of the law.
Under full faith and credit, the existence of the judgment is itself proof of
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its validity, and a case will not have to be re-examined on the merits by
the court from which recognition is requested. The court in the receiving
jurisdiction, after verifying that the original court properly assumed
jurisdiction, issues its own order, and that order is then enforced through
its normal enforcement channels.
Even though obtaining such a second order can be accomplished
through a summary judgment application, the procedure is still cumber-
some. Registration systems were designed to counteract this. Under a
registration scheme, it is no longer necessary to sue on ajudgment. REMO
provides such a system of registration, and this aspect of the statute should
be maintained and improved in any new Canadian enforcement of
maintenance orders statute.54 However, challenges to registration under
a new Canadian Act should be severely limited.
Some provision to allow the respondent to challenge the jurisdiction
of the originating court after the fact may be necessary in our federation.
But it is equally arguable that this principle, like other guiding principles
of REMO, is more applicable to the international context than to the
Canadian one. In Canada the argument is stronger that the proper place
for the respondent to argue the jurisdiction of the original court is before
the original court, not before the court of the receiving jurisdiction. If he
does not take advantage of this, he should not be rescued and given
another chance by being allowed to mount a jurisdictional challenge in
the receiving court. It is said that vexatiousness, expense and delay are the
three tools through which the rightful claims of impecunious litigants are
defeated. Nowhere is the risk of this greater than in family law.55
This does not necessarily mean that the courts of one province must
give blind faith and credit to the judgments of another.56 Under an
improved registration system, and with straightforward jurisdictional
rules written into the statute, a determination of whether the original court
had properly assumedjurisdiction could be placed within the authority of
the Clerk or Registrar of the court. Even if thejurisdictional rules of a new
statute are more nebulous, as in the modified common law approach, such
54. The U.S. Commission on child support also recognized the importance of a national
registration system: it recommended to Congress the implementation of such a system, as well
as a national computer network for the location of parents: see Haynes, supra note 41.
55. This, of course, is a problem deeply ingrained in our entire litigation system, and task
forces like Lord Woolf's Civil Justice Committee in England and the Ontario Civil Justice
study are only beginning to scratch the surface of the deep systemic changes that are required
to address this problem. See Sir. H. Woolf, Access to Justice: Final Report of the Lord
Chancellor on the Civil Justice System in England and Wales (London: HMSO, 1996); and
Ontario Civil Justice Review, CivilJustice Review: Supplemental and Final Report (Toronto:
Ontario Civil Justice Review, 1996).
56. See supra note 16.
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a determination need not involve copious litigation. An appeal of the
Registrar's decision by leave could be included.
After registration of an order under REMO, the statute provides a
thirty-day waiting period before enforcement during which the respon-
dent may mount another challenge to the order." This waiting period is
one more hurdle for interprovincial support claimants to cross before they
can finally realize on their judgments. Such a waiting period should not
be necessary under a full faith and credit system. Under these schemes,
no final order would be issued unless the respondent had had proper
notice, and the issuing court had both properly and appropriately assumed
jurisdiction according to the statute, which would accord with new
common law and constitutional norms. This assumption of jurisdiction
would be verified in a summary manner by the receiving court. With all
these safeguards in place, an order should become enforceable from the
day it is registered with the registering court.
III. The Australian Approach
The Australian approach provides yet another example of how a federal
state can deal with matters of intranational enforcement of maintenance
obligations. There, divorce and matrimonial causes are matters of federal
responsibility.58 This has been interpreted as giving power over mainte-
nance and support to the national government.59 The Commonwealth has
taken up this responsibility by the enactment of the Family Law Act
1975,60 the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988,61 and
the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989.62
In spite of the difference in distribution of powers between Australia
and Canada, Australian principles of interstate enforcement are of rel-
evance to the Canadian problem because they provide a model for some
of the things that could be done with full cooperation between the
provinces and between the provinces and the federal government, espe-
cially in the realm of appeal procedures and registration.
The Family Law Act 1975 legislated the creation of a unified family
court in the States (leaving the jurisdiction over family matters with the
57. REMO, supra note 6, s. 2(5).
58. Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act (U.K.), 1900, c. 12, s. 51(xxii).
59. Australia, Department of the Attorney-General, The Australian Constitution Annotated
(Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1980) at 101-2. Canadian constitu-
tional scholar Peter Hogg opines that: "It is arguable that the Canadian power is no less broad."
Constitutional Law of Canada, 3d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1992) at 649.
60. Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
61. Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 (Cth).
62. Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth).
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Supreme Courts in the Territories) and provided for an orderly transition
of case-load to the jurisdiction of that court. The Act sets out a choice of
law rule, interpretive principles, and provisions for the transfer of
proceedings where such transfer is in the interests of justice. Further, the
Family Law Act mandates cooperation between the different courts in
existence at its inception.63 The pertinent parts of the Act are as follows
(some subsections not reproduced):
39. (1) Subject to this Part, a person may institute a matrimonial cause
under this Act -
(a) in the Family Court; or
(b) in the Supreme Court of a State or Territory....
(5) Subject to this Part, the Supreme Court of each State is invested with
federal jurisdiction, and jurisdiction is conferred on the Family Court and
on the Supreme Court of each Territory, to hear and determine -
(a) matrimonial causes instituted under this Act;...
42 (2) Where it would be in accordance with the common law rules of
private international law to apply the laws of any country or place
(including a State or Territory), the court shall apply the laws of that
country or place....
45 (1) Where it appears to a court in which a matrimonial cause (including
a matrimonial cause instituted before the commencement of this Act) is
pending that a matrimonial cause (including a matrimonial cause instituted
before the commencement of this Act) in respect of the same marriage or
void marriage is pending in another court, the first-mentioned court may
stay the proceedings in that court for such time as it thinks fit or may
dismiss the proceedings.
(2) Where it appears to a court in which a matrimonial cause has been
instituted or is being continued under this Act that it is in the interests of
justice that the proceedings be dealt with in another court having jurisdic-
tion under this Act, the court may transfer the proceedings to the other
court....
47 All courts having jurisdiction under this Act shall severally act in aid
of and be auxiliary to each other in all matters under this Act.
The Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 provides a comprehensive
scheme for the determination of the amount of liability of a parent to a
child. The primary procedure for such determination is administrative,
and is engaged either by application for administrative assessment, or by
application for acceptance of an agreement for child support.' Appeals
from an administrative assessment can be made to a court having
63. Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s. 47.
64. Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth), s. 92.
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jurisdiction under the Act. Alternately, the courts have jurisdiction to
make a determination of support payable.65 An appeal of an incorrect
assessment by a court can be made within the appellate jurisdiction under
the Family Court Act,66 and by special leave to the High Court of
Australia.6 7 Detailed circumstances under which a court may modify,
discharge or suspend an order are listed, with the overriding stipulation
that such an alteration must be just and equitable as regards the child, the
custodian entitled to child support and the liable parent concerned; and
otherwise proper.
The Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act6 8 provides a
complete scheme for the registration of all Australian maintenance
liabilities. The payee of a registrable maintenance liability must, within
fouteen days of the order being made, inform the Registrar if she wishes
to have the order enforced. The Registrar enters the information into the
Child Support Register, and the liability becomes enforceable on the day
on which is it registered (with a few specific exceptions).
This registration system provides a model for the Canadian provinces
to imitate. If all judgments, whether by application of options 1, 2, or 3,
are recognized throughout Canada, an administrative system of registra-
tion should be all that is necessary for full implementation of a better
system for the enforcement of child support orders.
Conclusion
It is apparent that Canada is lagging behind other federations in dealing
with the issue of interjurisdictional support cases. REMO, steeped in
nineteenth-century traditions of common law conflict of laws rules and
based on a faulty vision of our country, works inconvenience and
injustice to many support claimants. We can do better. Perhaps the system
we devise cannot be as convenient as that of Australia; that is the price we
pay for the nature of our federation. But any one of the models discussed
here would be an improvement on REMO. The time has arrived for
serious consideration of these models.
65. Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth), ss. 99-100.
66. Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth), ss. 101-103.
67. Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth), s. 104.
68. 1988 (Cth).
